Difference between Truecrypt and OpenBSD ENCRYPTION

[D'Souza]

I would like to know the difference between the Truecrypt and OpenBSD ENCRYPTION. I do know that both of them providing very strong encryption and they are famous for their utmost and very complicated encryption algorithm. But still I want to know which one is the strongest among them.

[#4]

I prefer OpenBSD ENCRYPTION. In this case, by default the whole system is encrypted, so if one day they came to steal your laptop, and the individual inserts some live cd to mount your partitions and steal your important information, or using any other method, they will not get anything out of it. The Operating system is not encrypted, and if we were to steal the laptop is very easy access to information. The measures I have taken so far have been to place the BIOS password and disable the boot CD, but this is not enough, because if you open the machine and disable it or open the machine and removed the hard drive and place it on another computer.

[Victorious mind]

TrueCrypt creates so-called container. You are encrypted. However, you must specify the size of the Containers, which means that it needs a specific hard disk space. Otherwise, TrueCrypt is a great tool. There’s more to say about TrueCrypt. If you stay with Windows, it is easy to find better alternatives to TrueCrypt, which look better and be more pleasant to operate. And then, unfortunately, the cost a little money.

[HKrish]

Who says that OpenBSD is encrypted by default?, That is incorrect, the issue is as encrypted disks to protect the information, but you cannot be confused with the OpenBSD crypto used for administration of processes and communications userland and kernel. One thing has nothing to do with the other. If someone steals a laptop with OpenBSD installed by default will be able to enter all the information the same way as if it were a Windows, Linux or Leopard or whatever. The point of using crypto to encrypt disks or partitions is optional and is something you should do after installing the system. Normally the system stay with a phrase-of-way to avoid mounting the partitions until the phrase is entered, so if someone steals the drive or the laptop or pc, it will not be able to enter unless you know the phrase step. That in theory as long as there are attacks such as paid time the machine is only minutes using forensic techniques is possible to recover the passphrase of RAM, it has already been confirmed for software like TrueCrypt and software that uses FreeBSD and OpenBSD also. So cold attack to retrieve things from the RAM will always be possible if you have the right tools.

[The$Tourist]

Truecrypt 4.2a provides full functionality for Linux, but it is also possible, / root, but not with lucks to encrypt using Truecrypt. The approach is therefore to encrypt root partition / and to create a hidden volume, which itself / contains root (basically a copy of the "visible" / root). I will now be prompted while booting Linux for a password, then depends on the whether the visible / root or Hidden-/root to start (the principle of hidden TrueCrypt volumes under).

[AkshatShetty]

However, the standard encryption with cryptsetup on Ubuntu is not only costly and usable in Windows. For a cross-system TrueCrypt encryption would make more sense. I personally know of a lack of necessity for me, otherwise no other system-wide encryption software for Linux and Windows. Another solution would be split archives with the respective system-specific encoding. The "double encryption" as such would not lead to a loss of power, it cares very little whether the encryption of the data has now been encrypted or not. But the software encryption prevents the compressibility of the data carried in front of the hardware encryption. No compression means a corresponding loss of power in SF then drives and more wear, simply because more cells are described. I think basically for wear but no problem.