Ubuntu Administration via Webmin

[Zeppelin]

I recently came to know about the Webmin. Webmin is a incredible application which makes the administration of Ubuntu Server a superb thing. It's a web-based interface that facilitates you to configure and sustain your server without having to go close to any configuration files or learn any Linux commands. Now I want to know about Ubuntu Administration via Webmin. I am expecting some help from you members as soon as possible. More explanation about the topic would be grateful.

[StephanieRice]

Anyone who changes the administration wants to make something pleasant can use Webmin, and thus the server via a browser administer conveniently. As the software is not in the repositories, you must relate directly by the manufacturer. Should the server have a connection to the Internet, you can do this via console:

wget-c http://www.webmin.com/download/deb/webmin-current.deb

Webmin can then import as follows:

sudo apt-get install perl libnet-SSLeay-pam-perl libio-libauthen-pty-perl apt-show-versions libapt-pkg-perl

sudo dpkg-i webmin-current.deb

With a browser you can see the server now using https:: 10000 reach <IP-Adresse-Server> / /. Username and password are the same with the allocated during the installation.

[Xena]

Such a Webmin's great, why is it not included by default? A valid question. Of course, this software facilitates the administration immensely. On the other side brings each additional well-established program with the potential attack surface. This also applies to ongoing services that are not needed. One of the most common safety philosophy is: On a production server should only run software and services that are actually in use. Ubuntu 10.10 Maverick Meerkat brings the Linux kernel 2.6.35 with it. However, because of the growing popularity of Linux, that could open-source operating system in the future, the target of attack. For this reason, the kernel developers are trying to expand the protection measures.

[Joko]

A disturbing weakness in the Linux process interface is that an individual user memory and the states can examine the processes. If an attacker to compromise as Firefox, because he could read more data from ongoing processes, such as sth gpg-agent. Thus, would expand the area of the attack. According to Ubuntu , this is not a theoretical problem. SSH session hijacking and even injecting arbitrary codes are completely possible when ptrace is running in normal state. For this reason, some applications use prctl () to explicitly prohibit towing-ptrace. A general approach is ptrace, only from the parent process to child processes allow. The behavior is controlled by the sysctl Werin / proc / sys / kernel / yama / ptrace_scope. The default is 1, to block non-child-processes. If this value back to 0, the system allows more again. In some developing computers or computers with only one administrator account could this attitude be the preferred. For some time the rally TocToU a security problem. Mostly it is related to directories with all the world rights, such as / tmp /. This weakness is usually so used that attackers boundaries, rights which, by following a symbolic link. The solution here is that one in directories that the whole system are available, the following symlinks allowed only if the user matches. Some opponents argue that it violates POSIX. The Ubuntu developers are of the opinion that they had not thought about this for POSIX Vulnerability. comply with this specification at the expense of the security is not sustainable. Similarly, the arguments are "unknown applications, it can not keep running, this function use the" and "Applications should simply mkstemp () or 0_CREATE | 0_EXCL use" universe is no longer in Ubuntu. First, the software developer simply views and iron out. Secondly, it is not foolproof. Software is not perfect and mistakes would be made accessible.

[FlayoFish]

So-called hard links could be similarly exploited for attacks, as are the above-mentioned symbolic links is the case. However, the behavior is not limited only to directories with all the world rights. If, for example / etc / and / home / reside on the same partition, could each user simply hard link to / etc / shadow in its home directory, create one. The file retains the original rights, but programs with higher privileges, which are usually symlink certainly could read this file by the hard link. In addition, one could villains denial of service attack (DoS) by having write access to all folders using hard links and flood the entire disk space. The Ubuntu approach is that users can not create hard links to files for which they have no write permission. Here too there are similar arguments against, as is the case with the symlinks.