Types of DNS security threats

[Santiaago]

What are the different types of dns security threats involved. I want some information on these same. Likewise if I am working on a site which is not manged properly or less security things the to what attach ask does it is prone to. Second thing told me what is cache poisoning. What does this means and how to get rid of it. What can happen under it.

[Snake08]

For the reason that of the open, disseminated patten of the Domain Name System, and its use of the User Data gram Protocol (UDP), DNS is susceptible to a variety of forms of attack. Public or "open" recursive DNS resolvers are particularly at risk, since they do not confine or constrain incoming packets to a set of permissible source IP addresses. You should be are generally concerned with two common types of attacks.

[Zachary]

The types of attacks is Spoofing attacks most important to DNS cache poisoning. A variety of category of DNS spoofing and forgery take advantage of abound, which aim to transmit users from genuine sites to malevolent websites. These consist of so-called Kaminsky attacks, in which attackers take authoritative control of an entire DNS zone.

[Big Fish]

A number of class of dns assaults are Cache poisoning attacks. There are various alternatives of DNS spoofing assaults that can consequence in cache poisoning, but the common scenario is as follows that is like the attacker sends a objective DNS resolver multiple questions for a domain name for which is knows the server is not dependable, and that is unlikely to be in the server's cache.

[Shen]

The resolver sends out demands to other nameservers (whose IP addresses the attacker can also predict). In the meantime, the assailant floods the victim server with forged answers that come into view to create from the entrust name server. The answers include evidences that eventually resolve the requested domain to IP addresses controlled by the attacker.

[Steve123]

This happen mostly in cache poisoning assaults. If one of the forged answers matches the resolver demand (for example, by query or question name, type, ID and resolver source port) and is conventional before a answers from the genuine nameserver, the resolver recognizes the forged answers and caches it, and discards the genuine response. Future questions for the compromised domain or zone are answered with the forged DNS resolutions from the cache.